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CURRENT CASE
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS
EXTENDS BEYOND LITERAL DUPLICATION TO STRUC-
TURE, SEQUENCE, AND ORGANIZATION. Whelan Associ-
ates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1986), affig 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in a landmark ruling, has
further extended the copyright protection of computer programs by
holding that infringement may be found without literal duplication.
Although non-literal copying has supported findings of infringe-
ment in cases dealing with other subject matter, this is the first time
that copyright infringement of computer programs has been estab-
lished without evidence of literal copying.
Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. arose
out of a dispute between an independent software contractor and a
customer over the ownership of a commissioned computer pro-
gram. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., a medium-sized dental labo-
ratory operated principally by Rand Jaslow, produced and
distributed materials and devices used in the practice of dentistry.
In 1978, after his initial attempts to create a computer program to
simplify inventory, marketing, and bookkeeping tasks failed due to
his lack of expertise, Rand Jaslow turned to Strohl Systems Group
to design a custom-made program for the business. The software
development agreement stated that Elaine Whelan (an experienced
programmer and half owner of Strohl Systems) would be the pri-
mary developer of a dental laboratory software system to be used on
an IBM-Series 1 computer, with Strohl Systems retaining owner-
ship of all software and marketing rights while Jaslow Laboratory
was entitled to a 10% royalty on each program sold but with no
rights in any subsequent modifications of the program. Jaslow Lab-
oratory, as the pilot program, agreed to make its computer available
for demonstrations.
With Rand Jaslow providing information on business aspects
relating to the system, Elaine Whelan designed a dental laboratory
program written in EDL (the Event Driven Language for computer
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programming) by March 1979. She also designed other related pro-
grams, including a version of the Dentalab system for the IBM PC
computer which was more commercially promising due to the pop-
ularity and affordability of the underlying computer.
Thereafter, Elaine Whelan left Strohl Systems in November of
1979 and formed Whelan Associates, Inc. to develop and market
the Dentalab program. She was assigned all rights to the Dentalab
program package from Strohl and filed copyright registrations on
the Dentalab programs as literary works.'
A sales representative agreement was formed stating that Jas-
low Laboratory would be Whelan Associates' sales representative
due to Jaslow's superior buyer contacts. This agreement included
non-exclusive rights to market, sell or lease the Dentalab program,
and provided that Jaslow Laboratory would use its best efforts and
receive 35% of the gross price for all new packages sold in addition
to 5% of income from any modification sold and delivered. It was
also agreed that Elaine Whelan reserved a final right of approval
over all transactions and that all transactions would be in the name
of Whelan Associates. Either party could terminate the agreement
on thirty days notice after one year of operation providing all prop-
erty of the other party was returned.
Subsequently, Rand Jaslow realized that a great deal of money
could be made if the program could be rewritten in BASIC which
would adapt the program to the IBM PC personal computers which
many smaller dental labs were using. In his spare time, Rand Jas-
low attempted to write such a program using the information he
gained about the operation of the Dentalab system. He tried to du-
plicate the functions, screen formats, language, abbreviations, col-
lating methods, file structure and work flow pattern of the IBM
Series 1 Dentalab program. Although it was agreed that the source
codes2 to the Dentalab program were never to leave the possession
of either Strohl or Whelan, Rand Jaslow surreptitiously misappro-
priated a copy of the source code and utilized it in his attempts to
develop the IBM PC program. Frustrated again, Jaslow hired an
expert programmer, Jonathan Novak, to build upon his work and
finish the task. Novak quickly and successfully completed the Jas-
low "Dentcom PC" program.
1. Computer programs may be copyrighted as literary works or as audiovisual works.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
2. The "source code" is the set of computer instructions in a humanly readable format
typically set in a computer language such as BASIC, PASCAL, C, FORTRAN, EDL, or
COBOL. "Object code" is the translation of the source code into a virtually non-humanly
readable binary number format that is designed to be readable by the computer.
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During this time, indications appeared to Whelan that the two
year old business relationship was souring. Finally, Whelan re-
ceived a termination letter on January 31, 1983 claiming that Jas-
low Laboratory was the sole and absolute owner of the Dentalab
system, including exclusive marketing rights. Months later, Rand
Jaslow and the other defendants formed Dentcom, Inc. to market
dental laboratory software, including the Dentalab and Dentcom
programs. Dentcom and Jaslow Laboratory marketed the IBM PC
system, selling at least 23 licenses for a gross sales profit in excess of
$100,000.00. In addition, after formal termination of the sales rep-
resentation contract, Jaslow continued to advertise and sell Whe-
lan's IBM-Series 1 Dentalab systems-obtained by direct copying
of the system in use at Jaslow Laboratory-resulting in at least two
sales for gross profits in excess of $42,000.00.
Prior to the formation of Dentcom, Jaslow Laboratory filed
suit against Whelan Associates in Pennsylvania state court alleging
trade secret misappropriation. Whelan Associates countered by fil-
ing a copyright infringement action in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.3 Following the re-
moval of Jaslow's original trade secret action to federal court for
consolidation and Jaslow's unsuccessful motion for a preliminary
injunction, the case proceeded to trial where the court considered
and rejected the defenses interposed by Jaslow.
First, the court, unpersuaded by Rand Jaslow's co-authorship
claim, held that where a businessman only provides routine infor-
mation on business operations and specifies the data desired to a
programmer, it is not a sufficient contribution to make the resulting
program a "joint work" under 17 U.S.C. Section 101 where there is
no evidence of intent to constitute a co-authored work.4
Second, the court rejected the contention that the the copy-
right belonged to Jaslow under the "work-for-hire" doctrine of 17
U.S.C. Sections 101 and 201 (b),5 because the doctrine primarily
applies to employees and its application to independent contractors
(such as Whelan) was limited to very circumscribed situations6 not
found in the facts of the case. In the alternative, even if it were a
work-for-hire, the court held that the contractual reservation of
rights to Strohl Systems was effective to supersede statutory
presumptions.
3. 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
5. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 201(b) (1982).
6. Primarily relating to compilations of other's works and educational works.
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Third, regarding a claimed copyright violation resulting from
defendant's post-termination agreement sale of the two IBM Series
1 programs copied from Jaslow Laboratory's own copy, the court
held that while defendants owned the physical copy of the program,
they did not own the copyright which they violated by making and
selling unauthorized copies.
Fourth, the court rejected the contention that the Dentcom
program was not a copy of the expression of the Dentalab program
but merely a copy of the unprotectable idea behind it. The "expres-
sion of the idea" was broadly defined as "the manner in which the
program operates, controls and regulates the computer in receiving,
assembling, calculating, retaining, correlating, and producing useful
information either on a screen, print-out or by audio communica-
tion.7 It was held that the expression of a computer program may
be copied without literal copying of source and object code where
there is a copying of the method and manner in which the informa-
tion flows from one function to the next. The mere fact that the
source code of one program is written in one language while that of
the putative copy is written in a different language does not pre-
clude copyright infringement.
Jaslow's assertion that the IBM PC program was indepen-
dently designed and not a copy or derivative of the IBM Series 1
program was evaluated by the traditional two prong test for copy-
right violation: access plus substantial similarity.' Access was es-
tablished by Rand Jaslow's original familiarity with the program in
addition to his misappropriation of the program's source code. The
substantial similarity test9 was applied to facts developed in trial
through expert testimony. Plaintiff's expert testified that although
the defendant's Dentacom system was not a straight translation into
BASIC of the Dentalab program, the programs were sufficiently
similar in three significant respects: (1) the file structures were simi-
lar, (2) the screen outputs of the programs were very similar,'" and
7. 609 F. Supp. at 1320.
8. The access and substantial similarity requirements are excellently discussed and
summarized in M. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 13.03(A) (5th ed. 1979).
9. For a history and analysis of the application of the substantial similarity test to
computer subject matter, See Note, "Computer Copyright Infringement," 3 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH-TECH. L.J No. 2 (1987) (forthcoming).
10. Since the decision of the Third Circuit in Whelan, the District Court for the North-
ern District of California has held that screen formats copyrighted as audiovisual works are
protectable by copyright law even when they are not literally duplicated. See Broderbund,
Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., No. C-85-3457 (N. D. Cal. Oct 8, 1986). The Broderbund court
explicitly cited Whelan as authority for its holding. Broderbund is the very first of a series of
ripples which can be expected from the splash created by the Whelan decision.
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(3) five important subroutines within both programs (order entry,
invoicing, accounts receivable, end-of-day procedure, and end-of-
month procedure) performed almost identically in both programs.
Defendant's expert compared the source and object codes of both
programs and found substantial differences in programming style,
structure, algorithms, and data structure concluding Dentacom was
not derived from Dentalab.
After finding plaintiff's expert was better informed since he
viewed the actual system in operation, the court concluded that Jas-
low's IBM PC Dentcom program was an infringing copy of Whe-
lan's IBM Series 1 Dentalab program, and awarded damages, an
injunction, costs and attorneys' fees to the plaintiff.
Jaslow Laboratory appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
peal for the Third Circuit1' on two grounds attacking the District
Court's finding of substantial similarity. First, that the trial court's
finding of copyright infringement was without legal support since it
was beyond the scope of copyright protection and, secondly, that
the evidence before the trial court was insufficient to support the
verdict. The Third Circuit turned back both of Jaslow's challenges
and affirmed the District Court's interpretation of law and findings
of facts. Since the former question of law is of the utmost signifi-
cance to students of computer and copyright law and professionals
in the software industry while the latter is merely a fact finding
challenge, this casenote focuses on the issue of the scope of copy-
right law.
Jaslow's central argument on appeal was that the trial court's
finding of substantial similarity was without legal effect because it
concerned subject matter beyond the scope of copyright protection
for computer programs. Jaslow contended that the scope of copy-
right protection for software did not extend beyond literal copying
of elements of a program's source and object code because every
prior case where infringement was found had evidence of literal du-
plication. Since the District Court found no literal copying, but
only a similarity in overall program structures, it was asserted that
the finding of copyright infringement was void and in error as be-
yond the scope of the protection of copyright law.
In addressing this argument, the court held that a program's
11. The Third Circuit is no stranger to landmark cases in the computer law arena. The
Third Circuit decided Apple Computer Corp. v. Franklin Computers Inc., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d
Cir. 1983) which was the first case to hold that computer operating systems are copyrightable
subject matter and Williams v. Artie Electronics, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982) which was
the first case to find copyright infringement of a computer program based upon the use of the
substantial similarity test.
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copyright covers not only the literal elements of the program but
also the structure of the program itself, based on the following rea-
soning. The computer program at issue was copyrighted as a "liter-
ary work" under 17 U.S.C. Section 102(a)(1) 2 and courts have held
that non-computer program literary works can be infringed without
proof of literal copying. The earliest example of this is the classic
substantial similarity case of Nichols v. Universal Pictures,3 where
Judge Learned Hand made his oft-quoted statement that "It is of
course essential.. .that the [copy]right cannot be limited literally to
the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations."
Later courts, following the lead of Judge Hand, have generally up-
held findings of copyright infringement in non-computer subject ar-
eas where there is no literal copying.14 The Whelan court could
find no sound reason why computer programs should not be subject
to the same rule.
Entering the murky waters of the idea/expression dichotomy,
the court responded to the appellant's argument that the overall
structure of the computer program was equivalent to the nonpro-
tectable "idea" behind the program's "expression" by citing the
purpose test from Baker v. Selden,I5 which held where the purpose
behind the idea cannot be achieved by alternate structures, the
structure merges with the idea and is nonprotectable. Applying this
test, the court concluded that since the idea of a dental laboratory
accounting and inventory program could be achieved by many
structures, such programs would be protectable expressions. 6 Un-
fortunately, the complexity of the expression/idea dichotomy is not
clarified by the court's reasoning at this point since it perpetuates
the common pitfall in copyright analysis of failure to distinguish
between the question of levels of abstraction differentiating idea
from expression, on the one hand, and the general anti-monopoly
12. 17 U.S.C. § 107(a)(1) (1982).
13. 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 28 U.S. 902 (1931).
14. See Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th
Cir. 1983) (copyright violation may be found on thirteen alleged plot similarities between Star
Wars and Battlestar Galactica); Sid and Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. Mc-
Donald's Corp., 562 F.2d 115, 117 (9th Cir. 1977) (copyright violation can be based upon
overall similarities in the "total concept and feel" between the total similarities between the
H.R. Puffinstuff fantasy characters created by plaintiffs and the McDonaldland characters,
quoting Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970)).
15. Selden was the first U.S. Supreme Court decision to address the idea/expression
dichotomy in copyright law. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). See also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 217
(1954); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry v. Kalapakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971). Compare
Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th
Cir. 1982).
16. 797 F.2d at 1238.
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policy against giving copyright protection to a concrete expression
where it is the only reasonable one possible for a given idea, on the
other. 17 Because an idea is only capable of limited expression does
not ipso facto transform such expression into an idea. A more cor-
rect limited expression analysis admits the expression has been cop-
ied, but reasons that the policy against awarding a monopoly on a
particular idea with limited expressions prevents its protection by
copyright law. Given the facts of this case, a stronger analysis on
this point would have been provided by use of Judge Learned
Hand's abstractions test to establish that the low level of abstraction
at which structural similarities in the programs existed merited
copyright protection as expressions.
Aside from complete literal copying, the late Professor Nim-
mer distinguished two types of substantial similarity which indicate
copyright infringement: "fragmented literal similarity" and "com-
prehensive non-literal similarity."1 8 Prior computer copyright cases
have been limited to literal or "fragmented literal similarity" where
portions have been literally copied and incorporated into the de-
fendant's work. 9 This general approach of limiting copyright in-
fringement to literal copying has been given the somewhat mystical
moniker of the "iterative test."2 Perhaps the most significant as-
17. An early, and unfortunately influential, example of this analytic confusion between
the anti-competitive policy behind not allowing limited expressions to be copyrighted and
judging whether the level of abstraction merits classification as an idea or an expression,
appears in the opinion in Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F.
Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978). The analysis in Synercom has been uncritically adopted by
some commentators and courts, including the court in the recent case of Plains Cotton Coop-
erative Association of Lubbock, Texas, v. Goodpasture Computer Service, Inc. (No. 86-1126,
slip. op,, January 21, 1987) where the court declined to embrace the Whelan approach.
18. See supra note 15.
19. See Williams Electronics Inc. v. Artie International, Inc., 658 F.2d 870 (3d Cir.
1982), Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 546 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983), and SAS Institute,
Inc. v. S & H Computer Systems, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
20. Note, 68 MINN. L. Rav. 1264 (1984). Three principal arguments are advanced to
support the limiting of computer copyright to literal copying. First, that the structure of
computer programs is so different from other copyrighted subject matter in its higher degree
of intricacy that non-literal copying is per se non-infringing because of the great time and
effort involved. Id. at 1290. This argument erroneously assumes that time and effort in copy-
ing is a relevant factor in determining copyrightability. Second, that the structure of com-
puter programs is inherently too vague to permit non-literal infringement as a matter of
policy. Radcliffe, Recent Developments in Copyright Law Related to Computer Software, 4
COMPUTER L. REP. 189, 194-7 (1985). This contention fails to comprehend the fact that
the copying of the structure of computer programs is a matter of degree and that non-literal
copying of a program's structure may involve just as direct a misappropriation of the time,
labor, and creativity of others as if the lines of code were literally copied. Third, that because
the development of technological progress in programming is qualitatively different in involv-
ing the "stepping stone" use of the works of others, it would retard progress in the field to
extend non-literal copyright protection to computer programs. 68 MINN. L. REV. at 1292.
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pect of the Whelan decision is that it has officially extended the
scope of computer copyright protection to include Professor Nim-
mer's "comprehensive non-literal similarity," and thus moved be-
yond the constraints of the limited "iterative test."21
The Whelan court has more particularly held that when a com-
puter program is registered as a literary work, the following aspects
are protected by copyright law against "comprehensive non-literal"
copying. First, the general format of file structures is protectable.
This appears to be a complete "about-face" from the early decision
in Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co.22 where
computer input formats were held non-copyrightable subject matter
since they were like the non-copyrightable blank forms in Selden.23
The Synercom case and the blank forms argument was distin-
guished by cases such as Baldwin Cooke Co. v. Keith Clarke, Inc.,24
where blank forms were held copyrightable because their arrange-
ment of information was innovative and because they conveyed in-
formation in themselves. The Whelan court held computer file
structures protectable against non-literal copying to the degree that
they are innovative in arrangement and convey information.
Second, the court held that screen output from a copyrighted
computer program may be indirect evidence of probative value in
determining infringement of the underlying computer program,25
although such evidence alone would be insufficient to withstand
summary judgment or directed verdict motions.
Third, the court held that it was not necessary to prove the
This line of argument "begs the question" by assuming that non-literal copyright protection
would stifle the legitimate use of others' programs in building block fashion to advance the
field and then uses this very assumption as evidence to argue against the extension of copy-
right protection to non-literal elements. It assumes that non-literal "stepping stones" would
necessarily be sufficiently similar to the original programs to be infringing, again using circu-
lar reasoning and "begging the question." See supra note 9.
Since the iterative test limits substantial similarity to literal copying, it is inadequate to
deal with alteration as a means of avoiding copyright prosecution or to deal with translation
from a program used on one model of computer to another or translation between different
computer programming languages, as in the present case.
21. The court's reference to SAS Institute, Inc. v. S & H Computer Systems, Inc., 605
F. Supp. 816, as the "only other case where the court found that a program's copyright could
extend beyond its literal elements to its structure and organization" is technically not fully
accurate since the SAS court based its decision on an explicit finding of literal duplication of
functional and non-functional bits of copied code. 797 F.2d at 1239.
22. 462 F. Supp. at 1012.
23. See supra note 15.
24. 383 F. Supp. 650 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
25. Compare Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (E.D. I11. 1982)
where the audiovisual work was copyrighted but similarities in the underlying uncopyrighted
program were considered by the court.
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overall similarity of the entire programs to find copyright infringe-
ment, but that similarity of the overall structure, ordering, and pro-
cess sequences of selected component program modules may be
sufficient in itself for a finding of infringement without literal copy-
ing of source and object codes. Five subroutines26 between the
Dentalab and Dentcom programs were found to be non-literally
substantially similar, however the programs were not compared in
their entirety.27
Fourth, non-literal translations of a computer program from
one computer language to another are now protectable. This, too,
is a long overdue advance in computer copyright protection which
is a logical extension of the seminal reasoning in Apple v. Franklin.28
These holdings of the Whelan court are progressive, far-reach-
ing and constitute a significant change in the direction of copyright
protection for computer programs which marks the opening-up a
new frontier for copyright litigation. However, it is a frontier which
may be fraught with the hidden dangers of the proverbial "double
edged sword." It may cut one way to do justice to plaintiffs who are
now enabled to protect their rights against artful copiers, but it may
also cut in an unanticipated direction in the event that the same
sword may be used by some competitors in the software market-
place as a weapon with which to harass and forestall competitors
with similar products. As always, it is left to the wisdom of the
courts to ascertain in each individual case whether copyright law is
being used to rightfully protect a software developer's invention or
being misused to drive legitimate competitors with independently
developed products out of the marketplace. Since the vitality of our
high-technology industry depends upon rewarding innovation with
legal protection, the new direction in legal analysis begun by the
Whelan decision will contribute greatly to furthering rapid progress
in the computer field. The new frontier of computer copyright law
has begun to expand beyond the constraints of the iterative test;
26. "Subroutines" are relatively independent portions of computer programs which per-
form designated tasks for the larger program such as performing calculations on past ac-
counts to determine whether accounts payable are overdue or processing orders for products
and deducting those orders from the inventory on hand.
27. Note that the Whelan trial court did not compare the entire computer programs at
issue but based its holding on the non-literal copying of program components or modules.
Thus there is, as yet, no court which has specifically held that the overall structure of an
entire computer program-apart from points of similarity within its components-merits
copyright protection. Using Nimmer's terminology, it might be said that what is actually
involved in Whelan is not "comprehensive non-literal similarity" but fragmented or "compo-
nential non-literal similarity."
28. 714 F.2d at 1240.
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future court decisions will define the limits of this new realm of
copyright protection for computer programs.
Carl Sundholm
